Battle of Redinha | |||||||
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Part of the Peninsular War | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
French Empire |
United Kingdom, Portugal |
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Michel Ney | Viscount Wellington | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
7,000, 6 guns | 25,000, 12 guns | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
150 dead or wounded | 1,800 dead or wounded, |
The Battle of Redinha was a rearguard action which took place on March 12, 1811, during Masséna's retreat from Portugal, by a French division under Marshal Ney against a considerably larger Anglo-Portuguese force under Wellington. Challenging the Allies with only one or two divisions, Ney's 7,000 troops were pitched against 25,000 men. The success of Ney's action delayed the Allied advance and bought valuable time for the withdrawal of the main body of the French army.
Redinha was the second and most successful rearguard action fought during Masséna's retreat from the Lines of Torres Vedras in the spring of 1811. Having held off the British at Pombal on 11 March, Marshal Ney and the French rearguard had retreated to Redinha. Here he took up an apparently vulnerable position, with Mermet's division on a plateau south of the village, and Marchand's division north of the village on the far side of the Ancos River, linked by a narrow bridge, but Wellington was aware that he was close to much larger French formations, and proceeded very carefully.
By February 1810 Masséna, stalled for six months at the Lines of Torres Vedras, his men famished and demoralized, accepted the advice of his despondent lieutenants and began preparations to extricate the French army from Portugal. With his customary sang-froid Masséna drafted orders calling for the army to quit the Tagus abruptly between 4 and 6 March, aiming to secure Coimbra as a base from which to throw bridges over the Mondego River and afford the army a passage to safety. The French pursued a retrograde movement along the Mondego valley—which Masséna had long contemplated, were it not for Napoleon's express orders forbidding him to budge from the Tagus—hoping for better foraging country as they exhausted their last reserves of biscuit.
It is certainly astonishing that the enemy have been able to remain in this country so long; and it is an extraordinary instance of what a French army can do. ...They brought no provisions with them, and they have not received even a letter since they entered Portugal. With all our money, and having in our favour the good inclinations of the country, I assure you that I could not maintain one division in the district in which they have maintained not less than 60,000 men...for more than two months.