Battle of Pungdo | |||||||
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Part of the First Sino-Japanese War | |||||||
Ukiyoe by Kobayashi Kiyochika dated August 1894 |
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Belligerents | |||||||
Empire of Japan | Qing China | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Tsuboi Kozo | Fang Boqian | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
3 cruisers | 1 cruiser 2 gunboats 1 transport |
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Casualties and losses | |||||||
None | 1 gunboat sunk 1 transport sunk 1 gunboat captured 1,100 killed & wounded |
The Battle of Pungdo or Feng-tao (Japanese: Hoto-oki kaisen (豊島沖海戦?)) was the first naval battle of the First Sino-Japanese War. It took place on 25 July 1894 off Asan, Chungcheongnam-do, Korea, between cruisers of the Imperial Japanese Navy of Meiji Japan and components of the Beiyang Fleet of the Empire of China.
Both Qing China and Japan had been intervening in Korea against the Donghak Peasant Revolution. While China tried to maintain her suzerain relationship with Korea, Japan wanted to increase her sphere of influence. Both countries had already had troops in Korea as requested by different factions within the Korean government. Chinese troops from the Beiyang Army, stationed in Asan, south of Seoul, numbering 3,000 men in early July, could be effectively supplied only by sea through the Bay of Asan. This presented a situation very similar to the British position at the beginning of the Yorktown campaign during the American Revolution.
The Japanese plan was to blockade the entrance of the Bay of Asan, while her land forces moved overland to encircle the Beiyang Army detachment in Asan before reinforcements arrived by sea.
Some amongst the Chinese Beiyang Fleet command were aware of this dangerous situation and had advocated either the withdrawal of troops further north to Pyongyang (captain of cruiser Jiyuan, Fang Boqian, the ranking Chinese officer in the Battle of Pungdo, among them), or the sailing the entire Beiyang fleet to Incheon as a deterrent against Japanese intentions. However, the Qing leadership was split between Viceroy Li Hongzhang's basic instinct to protect his fleet from danger and the Guangxu Emperor's demand for a stronger stand. As a compromise, the detachment at Asan was to be reinforced for the time being under escort by ships already on station in Korean waters. Inaction paralyzed the Chinese command on the eve of war.