Operation Chavín de Huántar | |||||||
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Part of the Internal conflict in Peru | |||||||
A model representing Operation Chavín de Huántar. |
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Belligerents | |||||||
Military of Peru | Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Alberto Fujimori Juan Valer Sandoval † |
Néstor Cerpa Cartolini † | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
142 Peruvian commandos | 14 MRTA rebels | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
2 commandos killed | All 14 rebels killed | ||||||
1 Peruvian hostage killed |
Operation Chavín de Huántar was a military operation in which a team of one hundred and forty-two commandos of the Peruvian Armed Forces ended the 1997 Japanese embassy hostage crisis by raiding the Japanese ambassador's residence and freeing the hostages held there by the terrorist organization Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) being considered one of the most successful hostage rescues in the world.
The name Chavín de Huántar was chosen for the operation because to make the incursion possible, tunnels were to be dug under the ambassador's residence from adjacent buildings. Chavín de Huántar is an archeological site in the central highlands of Peru which is famous for its underground passageways. It is said that President Alberto Fujimori himself came up with the name.
The rescue operation was prepared and exercised in an exact replica of the residence located at the nearby Chorrillos Military School; there the commandos practiced every detail of the operation, including the weight of the explosion to be used to open the floor of the embassy.
Key to the operation was the intelligence provided by Antonio Ibarcena, admiral of the Peruvian Navy at the time and former commander of a special operations group. He received and distributed 100s of bugged items in the building and himself communicated by radio with the Peruvian military.
During the course of the assault on 22 April 1997, two commandos, one hostage, and all fourteen of the rebels died. The success of the operation was tainted by subsequent claims, backed by several witnesses, that at least three and possibly eight of the rebels had been summarily executed by the commandos after surrendering. There are also rumours that Vladimiro Montesinos, Chief of Military Intelligence, ordered the execution of the only dead hostage, Carlos Guisti and Francisco Tudela who were political rivals of Alberto Fujimori.