Oil Campaign | |||||||
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Part of the strategic bombing campaigns in Europe during World War II |
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The Sandman, a B-24 Liberator, emerges from smoke over the Astra Română refinery, Ploiești, during Operation "Tidal Wave" (1 August 1943).
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Belligerents | |||||||
United States United Kingdom |
Germany Romania |
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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Carl Krauch | ||||||
Ion Antonescu, Prime Minister of Romania Paul Pleiger, Reich Commissioner for Coal and "manager of important fuel plants". |
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Strength | |||||||
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See Defence of the Reich | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
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The Allied Oil Campaign of World War II was directed by the RAF and USAAF against facilities supplying Nazi Germany with petroleum, oil, and lubrication (POL) products. Part of the immense Allied strategic bombing effort during the war, the targets in Germany and "Axis Europe"; included refineries for natural oil, factories producing synthetic fuel, storage depots, and other POL infrastructure resources.
The reliance of Germany on oil and oil products for its war machine was identified before the war and the strategic bombing started with RAF attacks on Germany in 1940. After the US entered the war, it carried out daytime "precision bombing" attacks such as Operation Tidal Wave against refineries in Romania in 1943. The last major strategic raid of the European theater of the war was on a refinery in Norway in April 1945. During the war the effort expended against POL targets varied with the relative priority given to other objectives such as defeating the German V-weapon attacks or preparations for the invasion of western Europe in 1944.
The British had identified the importance of Germany's fuel supplies before the war in their "Western Air Plan 5(c)". The focus of British bombing during 1940 changed repeatedly in response to directives from the Air Ministry. At the start of June, oil targets were made a priority of night bombing with attacks on other war industry to be made on dark nights (when the oil targets could not be located) but with the proviso that "indiscriminate action" should be avoided. On 20 June oil targets were made third priority below the German aircraft industry and lines of communication between Germany and the armies at the front. Following a brief period when German shipping was given priority, oil targets were made secondary priority in mid July under a policy of concentrated attack with five oil refineries listed for attention.Sir Charles Portal was sceptical of the likelihood of success, saying that only a few targets could be located by average crews under moonlit conditions.