Fundamental attribution error

In social psychology, the fundamental attribution error, also known as the correspondence bias or attribution effect, is the claim that in contrast to interpretations of their own behavior, people place undue emphasis on internal characteristics of the agent (character or intention), rather than external factors, in explaining other people's behavior. The effect's existence has been challenged by one peer-reviewed article.

The phrase was coined by Lee Ross some years after a classic experiment by Edward E. Jones and Victor Harris (1967). Ross argued in a popular paper that the fundamental attribution error forms the conceptual bedrock for the field of social psychology. Jones wrote that he found Ross' phrase "overly provocative and somewhat misleading", and also joked: "Furthermore, I'm angry that I didn't think of it first." Some psychologists, including Daniel Gilbert, have used the phrase "correspondence bias" for the fundamental attribution error. Other psychologists have argued that the fundamental attribution error and correspondence bias are related but independent phenomena, with the former being a common explanation for the latter.

As a simple example of the behavior attribution error theory seeks to explain, consider the situation where Alice, a driver, is about to pass through an intersection. Her light turns green and she begins to accelerate, but Bob drives through the red light, crossing in front of her. Consider too the situation where Alice makes the same mistake, driving through a red light. If the fundamental attribution error holds, she would consider Bob to be unskilled or reckless rather than influenced by situational causes (as would be the case were he rushing a patient to the hospital). By contrast, fundamental attribution error predicts that Alice will view her own behavior as the result of situational causes and not as a reflection of her internal characteristics. The validity of several theories depend on whether this pattern, in fact, occurs.

Jones and Harris hypothesized, based on the correspondent inference theory, that people would attribute apparently freely-chosen behaviors to disposition, and apparently chance-directed behaviors to situation. The hypothesis was confounded by the fundamental attribution error.

Subjects read essays for and against Fidel Castro, and were asked to rate the pro-Castro attitudes of the writers. When the subjects believed that the writers freely chose positions for or against Castro, they naturally rated the people who spoke in favor of Castro as having a more positive attitude towards Castro. However, contradicting Jones and Harris' initial hypothesis, when the subjects were told that the writer's positions were determined by a coin toss, they still rated writers who spoke in favor of Castro as having, on average, a more positive attitude towards Castro than those who spoke against him. In other words, the subjects were unable to properly see the influence of the situational constraints placed upon the writers; they could not refrain from attributing sincere belief to the writers. Therefore, the experimental group provided more internal attributions towards the writer.

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