Battle of Buna-Gona

Battle of Buna–Gona
Part of the Pacific Theatre of World War II
An Australian soldier, Private George "Dick" Whittington, is aided by Papuan orderly Raphael Oimbari, near Buna on 25 December 1942. Whittington died in February 1943 from the effects of scrub typhus. (Picture by George Silk, AWM104028)
Date 16 November 1942 – 22 January 1943 Location Territory of Papua Coordinates: 8°39′S 148°22′E / 8.650°S 148.367°E / -8.650; 148.367 Result Allied victory
Belligerents
Australia  United States	Japan
Commanders and leaders
Edmund Herring George Vasey Edwin F. Harding Robert L. Eichelberger	Yosuke Yokoyama Yoshitatsu Yasuda from 6 December: Tsuyuo Yamagata
Units involved
See Battle of Buna–Gona: Allied forces and order of battle	See Battle of Buna–Gona: Japanese forces and order of battle
Strength
20,000+ (total)	5,500 – 6,500 (initially) 11,000 – 12,000 (total)
Casualties and losses
1,991 killed, 12,300+ injured or sick	7,000 killed, 1,200 injured (evacuated), 250+ captured

The Battle of Buna–Gona was part of the New Guinea campaign in the Pacific Theatre during World War II. It followed the conclusion of the Kokoda Track campaign and lasted from 16 November 1942 until 22 January 1943. The battle was conducted by Australian and United States forces against the Japanese beachheads at Buna, Sanananda and Gona. From these, the Japanese had launched an overland attack on Port Moresby. In light of developments in the Solomon Islands campaign, Japanese forces approaching Port Moresby were ordered to withdraw to and secure these bases on the northern coast. Australian forces maintained contact as the Japanese conducted a well-ordered rearguard action. The Allied objective was to eject the Japanese forces from these positions and deny them their further use. The Japanese forces were skilful, well prepared and resolute in their defence. They had developed a strong network of well-concealed defences.

Operations in Papua and New Guinea were severely impacted by terrain, vegetation, climate, disease and the lack of infrastructure. In turn, these imposed significant logistical limitations. During the Kokoda Track campaign, these factors applied more-or-less equally to both belligerents but favoured the defender in attacks against well-fortified positions. The battlefield and logistical constraints limited the applicability of conventional Allied doctrine of manoeuvre and firepower. During the opening stages of the offensive, the Allies faced a severe shortage of food and ammunition. This problem was never entirely resolved. The battle also exposed critical problems with the suitability and performance of Allied equipment. The combat effectiveness of US forces, particularly the US 32nd Division, has been severely criticised. These factors were compounded by repeated demands from General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, for a rapid conclusion to the battle. The demands were more to politically secure and strengthen the position of MacArthur's command than for any strategic need. In consequence, troops were hastily committed to battle on repeated occasions, increasing Allied losses and ultimately lengthening the duration of the battle.

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