Attack on the Sui-ho Dam | |||||||
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Part of the Korean War | |||||||
F-80C fighter-bomber of the 8th FBG with wing-mounted bombs |
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Belligerents | |||||||
Soviet Union North Korea |
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Otto P. Weyland | Georgii A. Lobov | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
670 USAF, USN, USMC fighter/fighter-bombers |
210 VVS MiG interceptors 275 PLAAF/KPAAF (UAA) MiGs 87 major AA guns |
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Casualties and losses | |||||||
Five fighter/fighter-bombers lost or written off |
Multiple MiGs shot down/destroyed Permanent destruction of 90% of generating capacity, power outage in North Korea for two weeks and reduction of available power to northeast China by 23% |
Multiple MiGs shot down/destroyed
Unknown number of AA guns destroyed/damaged
The attack on the Sui-ho Dam was the collective name for a series of mass air attacks during the Korean War on thirteen hydroelectric generating facilities by United Nations Command air forces on June 23–24 and June 26–27, 1952. Primarily targeting the hydroelectric complex associated with the Sui-ho Dam in North Korea, the attacks were intended to apply political pressure at the stalled truce negotiations at Panmunjeom.
Heavily defended by Soviet Air Forces and major anti-aircraft guns, the hydroelectric targets were subjected to attacks totaling 1,514 sorties. These were conducted jointly by fighters and fighter-bombers of the United States Air Force, United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and South African Air Force, the first time in 21 months that the separate air arms had worked together on a massive scale. The attack on the facilities was followed seventeen days later by another series of large-scale joint attacks on the capital city of Pyongyang.
The attacks succeeded in permanently destroying 90% of the facilities struck and completely knocked out power in North Korea for two weeks, as well as reducing available power to northeast China by 23%. North Korea, however, built new facilities but did not restore its previous capacity until after the armistice in 1953. Their effect on the truce talks was also nil, as highly publicized repercussions in both the UK and the United States Congress undermined their impact.