Qualia

In philosophy and certain models of psychology, qualia (/ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/; singular form: quale) are individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term "qualia" derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkʷaːlɪs]) meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind". Examples of qualia include the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, or the perceived redness of an evening sky. As qualitative characters of sensation, qualia stand in contrast to "propositional attitudes".

Philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett once thought on his own initiative that qualia was "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us".

Much of the debate over their importance hinges on the definition of the term, and various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia. As such, the nature and existence of various definitions of qualia remain controversial.

There are many definitions of qualia, which have changed over time. One of the simpler, broader definitions is: "The 'what it is like' character of mental states. The way it feels to have mental states such as pain, seeing red, smelling a rose, etc."

...
Wikipedia