New York state public benefit corporations and authorities operate like quasi-private corporations, with boards of directors appointed by elected officials, overseeing both publicly operated and privately operated systems. Public authorities share characteristics with government agencies, but they are exempt from many state and local regulations. Of particular importance, they can issue their own debt, allowing them to bypass limits on state debt contained in the New York State Constitution. This allows public authorities to make potentially risky capital and infrastructure investments without directly putting the credit of New York State or its municipalities on the line. As a result, public authorities have become widely used for financing public works, and they are now responsible for more than 90% of the state's debt. The growing influence of public authorities over state and local financing, coupled with their ability to avoid regulations applicable to government agencies, has led to calls for reform. Some reforms were passed in the Public Authorities Accountability Act of 2005.
Public benefit corporations in New York State have origins in mercantile capitalism. A shared tradition of English common law and Dutch law may explain their origins.
The New York Court of Appeals provided a thorough history of state laws regarding public authorities in the 1994 case Schulz v. State, 84 N.Y.2d 231. As the court explained, state debt limits were first enacted as a reaction to fiscal crises caused by the state's lending of its credit to "irresponsible" canal and railroad corporations in the early nineteenth century. The state was forced to assume these obligations, which amounted to more than three fifth's of the state's entire debt. In 1846, a referendum requirement was added to the state constitution, prohibiting the state from contracting long term debt without approval by the voters.
As early as 1851, the legislature began to search for ways to evade the constitutional debt limit in order to finance public works projects. Canal certificates, which would be repaid through canal revenues, and which by their terms were not state obligations, were nevertheless held to be unconstitutional in Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 9 (1852). The court held that the state had a moral obligation to repay the debts if canal revenues proved insufficient, and thus the certificates were deemed "an evasion if not a direct violation of the constitution".