Landing at Pontian | |||||||
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Part of the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation | |||||||
The Pontian seaside, where Indonesian forces landed in August 1964. |
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Belligerents | |||||||
Indonesia | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Unknown | Sukarno | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
~2,500 Malaysians | 108 Indonesian paratroops with Malaysian-Chinese guides | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Unknown, but minuscule | 104 killed or captured |
The Landing at Pontian (17 August 1964) was an amphibious landing made by a small body of Indonesian troops in the Pontian District of southwestern Malaysia. The landing took place during the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation, an undeclared war fought between Malaysia and Indonesia during the early 1960s over the creation of a Malaysian Federation encompassing parts of northern Borneo, areas that Indonesia sought to increase her own power in Southeast Asia.
On 17 August 1964, Indonesian President Sukarno announced a 'Year of Dangerous Living' as a part of his country's Independence Day celebrations. To reinforce his point, Sukarno had ordered that a force of Indonesian troops and exiled Malaysian-Chinese land in mainland Malaysia to kick off a campaign of such invasions to create guerrilla bases in enemy territory and stir up Communist sympathizers. The effort was a failure, as targeted Malaysians proved unreceptive to Indonesian efforts and the invaders were swiftly rounded up by Anglo-Malaysian security forces.
The landing shocked the British, who had not expected such a strong and prominent step from the Indonesians, but did not incite them to respond to Sukarno's escalation of tensions. The absence of violent reply stiffened Sukarno's burgeoning resolve, and led him to continue with more landings, amphibious and airborne, throughout the fall and winter of 1964.
During the celebrations of Indonesia's independence from the Netherlands on 17 August 1964, President of Indonesia Sukarno declared that the year to come would be a 'Year of Dangerous Living.' This was meant to signal his intent upon stepping up the ongoing Confrontation with Malaysia so much as to toe the line of a powerful Anglo-Malaysian military response. Unbeknownst to his people or the Malaysians and their allies, however, Sukarno meant to follow through with his statement, and had planned a series of air and seaborne attacks against the Malaysian peninsula, an overtly aggressive act in what had been so far a conflict contained to northern Borneo. Though this was a risky move, it had a chance of capitalizing upon recent unrest in Malaya and Singapore by putting Indonesian soldiers and sympathizers inside Malaysian territory, where they could attempt to raise the populace against a very new government to whom they owed little loyalty.