KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.
| KSR v. Teleflex | |
|---|---|
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| Argued November 28, 2006 Decided April 30, 2007 |
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| Full case name | KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., et al. |
| Docket nos. | 04-1350 |
| Citations | 550 U.S. 398 (more)
127 S. Ct. 1727; 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385
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| Prior history | Summary judgment granted for Defendant, 298 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Mich. 2003); rev'd, 119 Fed. Appx. 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005); cert. granted, 547 U.S. 902 (2006) |
| Subsequent history | Affirming district court judgment, 228 Fed. Appx. 988 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 20, 2007) (unpublished opinion) |
| Holding | |
| The Federal Circuit erred in rigidly applying the narrow teaching/suggestion/motivation standard for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. §103, for precluding application of "obvious to try" considerations, and for too rigidly constricting the use of hindsight, in conflict with the broader obviousness evaluation established in Graham. Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. | |
| Court membership | |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Kennedy, joined by unanimous |
| Laws applied | |
| 35 U.S.C. § 103 | |
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States concerning the issue of obviousness as applied to patent claims.
Teleflex sued KSR International, claiming that one of KSR's products infringed Teleflex's patent on connecting an adjustable vehicle control pedal to an electronic throttle control. KSR argued that the combination of the two elements was obvious, and the claim was therefore not patentable. The district court ruled in favor of KSR, but the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed in January 2005.
Oral arguments were heard by the Supreme Court on November 28, 2006. The petitioner, KSR, was represented by James W. Dabney. Deputy solicitor general Thomas G. Hungar represented the government, which sided with the petitioner. Thomas C. Goldstein argued on behalf of the respondent, Teleflex.
On April 30, 2007, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the Federal Circuit, holding that the disputed claim 4 of the patent was obvious under the requirements of 35 U.S.C. §103, and that in "rejecting the District Court’s rulings, the Court of Appeals analyzed the issue in a narrow, rigid manner inconsistent with §103 and our precedents," referring to the Federal Circuit's application of the "teaching-suggestion-motivation" (TSM) test.
Justice Kennedy's opinion stated, "A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton." He acknowledged that his description of a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) does not necessarily conflict with other Federal Circuit cases that described a PHOSITA as having "common sense" and who could find motivation "implicitly in the prior art." Kennedy emphasized that his opinion was directed at correcting the "errors of law made by the Court of Appeals in this case" and does not necessarily overturn all other Federal Circuit precedent.
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