ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co.

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 22–23, 1897 Decided May 24, 1897
Full case name	Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Company
Citations	167 U.S. 479 (more) 17 S. Ct. 896; 42 L. Ed. 243; 1897 U.S. LEXIS 2111
Prior history	Certificate from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Court membership
Chief Justice Melville Fuller Associate Justices Stephen J. Field · John M. Harlan Horace Gray · David J. Brewer Henry B. Brown · George Shiras, Jr. Edward D. White · Rufus W. Peckham
Case opinions
Majority	Brewer, joined by Fuller, Field, Gray, Brown, Shiras, White, Peckham
Dissent	Harlan
Laws applied
Interstate Commerce Act

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co., 167 U.S. 479 (1897), was an important early U.S. Supreme Court case in the development of American administrative law.

The power of an administrative agency is executive and administrative, but not legislative. The scope of authority held by an agency is determined by the agency's organic statute. Where an administrative agency wishes to assume the traditionally legislative power to make policy, the power must be expressly granted by the agency's organic statute, and not implied from other terms of the statute. This principle applies especially where the policy involves issues of great consequence.

Note: This principle was later qualified by cases such as NBC v. US which provided for more expansive powers for administrative agencies.

The ICC set rates for rail transport, and issued an order requiring all rail companies who charged more than the set rates to cease operations. The ICC then went to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals to seek a legal injunction requiring the Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway to comply with the order. The 6th circuit sent a certified question to the US Supreme Court, asking:

Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined that the ICC had no such power.

The ICC's authority stemmed from the Interstate Commerce Act, the organic statute which gave the ICC life, and determined the extent of its powers. The Court considered two possible ways that Congress might vest the power to set rates in the ICC: expressly in the statute, or implied from the terms of the statute.