Although in March 1987 Gustáv Husák nominally committed Czechoslovakia to follow the program of perestroika, he nevertheless cautioned the party in October 1987 not to "hasten solutions too quickly" so as to "minimize the risks that could occur." (December 1, 1987)
On December 17, 1987, Husák, who was one month away from his seventieth birthday, had resigned as head of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC). He retained, however, his post of president of Czechoslovakia and his full membership on the Presidium of the KSC. Husák's resignation was caused by failing health and by increasing ambitions of the party members Miloš Jakeš, Ladislav Adamec and Vasil Biľak, which became apparent since the spring of 1987. Miloš Jakeš, who replaced Husák as first secretary of the KSC, was sixty-five years of age at the time of his assumption of the most powerful post in the country. Other than the age difference and the fact that Jakeš is a Czech whereas Husák is a Slovak, there was little to distinguish the new leader from his predecessor. In his first pronouncements as the head of the KSC, Jakes assured the KSC's Central Committee that he would continue the cautious and moderate path of reform set forth by Husák. He called for a large-scale introduction of new technology as the means to "fundamentally increase the efficiency of the Czechoslovak economy." But he also warned that there would be no "retreat from the fundamental principles of socialism," adding that the party had learned well the "lesson from 1968-69 and know[s] where such a retreat leads." At the same time, Jakeš acknowledged Soviet pressure for reform by pledging to pursue economic restructuring, stating that "just as Soviet Communists, we too must observe the principle that more democracy means more socialism."
The Czechoslovak version of perestroika, which had slowly taken shape during the last months of Husák's rule under the guidance of the reformist and pro-Mikhail Gorbachev Czechoslovak leader Premier Lubomir Strougal, called for a modest decentralization of state economic administration but postponed any concrete action until the end of the decade. The slow pace of the Czechoslovak reform movement was an irritant to the Soviet leadership. Economically, however, it was surely partly because on the one hand there were no serious economic problems at the standard-of-living level in Czechoslovakia as opposed to e.g. Poland, the Soviet Union and Hungary, and on the other hand the catastrophic initial effects of the reforms in the Soviet Union and Hungary could already be seen in the late 1980s. A corroboration of this might be the fact that Gustáv Husák, before his resignation in 1989 (see Velvet Revolution), told to the newly appointed anti-Communist government they can expect very difficult years to come. The dissatisfaction of many ordinary Czechs and Slovaks was increasing, due to the rigid political situation, lack of freedom, but mainly because they could see on foreign TV channels in some regions (West German in frontier Bohemia, Austrian in southwestern Slovakia (including the capital Bratislava)), and in the late 1980s in all regions due to a gradual spread of videorecorders, the way of living in Western Europe and in the USA.