HGM-25A Titan I

Titan I

Launch of a Titan I SM/567.8-90 ICBM from Cape Canaveral
Function	ICBM
Manufacturer	Martin Company
Country of origin	United States
Cost per launch	US$ 1.5 million (1962)
Size
Height	31 m
Diameter	3.05 m
Mass	105,140 kg
Stages	2
Launch history
Status	Retired
Launch sites	Cape Canaveral LC-15, LC-16, LC-19 & LC-20 Vandenberg AFB OSTF SLTF LC-395
Total launches	70
Successes	53
Failures	17
First flight	6 February 1959
Last flight	5 March 1965
First stage
Engines	1 LR87-AJ-3
Thrust	1,900 kN (430,000 lbf)
Specific impulse	290 seconds
Burn time	140 seconds
Fuel	RP-1/LOX
Second stage
Engines	1 LR91-AJ-3
Thrust	356 kN (80,000 lbf)
Specific impulse	308 sec
Burn time	155 seconds
Fuel	RP-1/LOX

The Martin Marietta SM-68A/HGM-25A Titan I was the United States' first multistage Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in use from 1959 until 1965. Incorporating the latest design technology when designed and manufactured, the Titan I provided an additional nuclear deterrent to complement the U.S. Air Force's SM-65 Atlas missile. It was the first in a series of Titan rockets, but was unique among them in that it used liquid oxygen and RP-1 as propellants, while the later Titan ICBM versions all used storeable fuels instead. Though the SM-68A was operational for only three years, it was an important step in building the Air Force's strategic nuclear forces.

The program began in January 1955 when the Scientific Advisory Committee recommended an alternate approach to the ICBM. In May 1955 the Air Material Command invited contractors to submit proposals and bids for the two stage alternate source ICBM. In September 1955 Martin was declared the contractor for the Titan missile. In early October the Air Force's Western Development Division was ordered to commence the Titan program. The Titan was developed in parallel with the Atlas (SM-65/HGM-16) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. The Air Force's goal in launching the Titan program was threefold: one, to serve as a backup should Atlas fail; two, to develop a large, two-stage missile with potentially superior performance; and third to introduce competition which the head of Ballistic Missile Division, Brigadier General Bernard Schriever, thought might spur the Atlas contractor to work harder Martin was selected as the contractor for two reasons. First it proposed a superior organization. Second was that Martin proposed a method of dealing with the problem of igniting a liquid fueled engine at high altitude.

The Titan I was initially designated B-68 in the numbering sequence of bombers. It was later designate SM-68; then in 1962 it was redesignated HGM-25A.

The previous strategic missile programs of the Air Force had been administered using the "single prime contractor concept" (later called the weapon system concept). This had resulted in three badly botched programs; the programs of the Snark, Navaho and RASCAL missiles had slipped an average of 5 years and had cost overruns of 300 per cent or more. The Teapot Committee had been created to evaluate requirements for, and methods of accelerating the development of ballistic missiles. Applying the Teapot committee's recommendations to manage ballistic missile programs the Air Research and Development Command established the Western Development Division and Brigadier General Bernard Schriever was detailed to command it. Schriever devised an entirely new organization for program management. The Air Force was to act as "prime contractor," the Ramo-Woolridge Corporation was contracted to provide systems engineering and technical direction of all ballistic missiles. The airframe contractor also would assemble the sub-systems provided by other Air Force contractors. This new organization was very controversial.