Force H

Force H
Force H off Gibraltar in 1940 by Rowland Langmaid.
Active	1940–1943
Country	United Kingdom
Branch	Royal Navy
Engagements	Battle of the Mediterranean Attack on Mers-el-Kébir Battle of Cape Spartivento
Commanders
Notable commanders	Vice-Admiral Sir James Somerville (July 1940 - March 1942) Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Harwood (March 1942 - April 1945)

Force H was a British naval formation during the Second World War. It was formed in 1940, to replace French naval power in the western Mediterranean removed by the French armistice with Nazi Germany. The force occupied an odd place within the naval chain of command. Normal British practice was to have naval stations and fleets around the world, whose commanders reported to the First Sea Lord via a flag officer. Force H was based at Gibraltar but there was already a flag officer at the base, Flag Officer Commanding, North Atlantic. The commanding officer of Force H did not report to the Flag Officer but direct to the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound.

One of the first operations that Force H took part in was connected with the reason for its formation. French naval power still existed in the Mediterranean, and the British Government viewed it as a threat to British interests. It was feared that the Vichy government of Philippe Pétain would hand the ships over to Germany, despite a vow that that would never happen. Such an incidence would almost certainly decisively tip the balance against Britain in the Mediterranean. Consequently, Force H was ordered to execute Operation Catapult.

The most powerful of the remaining French forces was in port at Mers-el-Kébir in Algeria. It consisted of the French battleships Strasbourg and Dunkerque, two older battleships, along with escorting vessels. Force H steamed to off the Algerian coast, and an envoy was sent to the French commander. Various terms were offered, including internment of the fleet in a neutral country, joining the British forces, or scuttling the fleet at its berths. However, the commander of the French forces reported only the scuttling option to his superiors. He was thus ordered to fight. The reasons for the omission have been debated by many. It is often thought that the anti-British bias of the French commander was to blame.