The Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 (29 July 1913) was an agreement between the Sublime Porte of the Ottoman Empire and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland which defined the limits of Ottoman jurisdiction in the area of the Persian Gulf with respect to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the Shatt al-‘Arab. Signed, but never ratified, the long-lasting impact of the agreement was that of the status of Kuwait; the basis for both formal independence and the frontiers of modern Kuwait were established.
Informal negotiations began on July 29, 1911 in a British memorandum sent to the Ottoman Government. By this time, it seemed likely that the terminus for the German funded and engineered Baghdad Railway would be situated in Kuwait. Kuwait had been under Ottoman administration since 1871 and in 1875 was included in the Basra Vilayet, yet Ottoman rule was mainly nominal. Although the sheikhdom now fell under the Empire’s jurisdiction, no Ottoman official was stationed in Kuwait. Influence over Kuwait was crucial to British foreign policy in the Persian Gulf with regard to commerce and strategic interests concerning India.
To the British, further extension of the railway line meant further expansion of Ottoman influence, and the current administration—already emboldened by the “Young Turk” regime—desired to reestablish effective control over its empire south of Kuwait. Even worse, was the possible encroachment of other European powers. In the proposed memorandum, the British therefore sought to regularize the 1901 Status Quo agreement, with the added refinement of a clear definition of Kuwait’s boundaries to Britain’s advantage.
Although at times deadlocked, negotiations communicated via memorandums continued on a quid pro quo basis in which the British had the advantage; if the Ottomans were to accept Kuwait’s autonomous status and proposed boundaries, the British would have to accept Ottoman suzerainty, and in return, the northern islands of Warba and Bubiyan must be allocated to Kuwait, and so forth. The waning influence of Istanbul in the Gulf forced it to make concessions without much to gain in return. The Ottoman Empire had faced a number of setbacks in the last few decades—a few of its provinces achieved independence, some were annexed by other countries, or many lost in conflict—and for internal political reasons it may have seemed important to maintain Kuwait as part of the empire, even if only symbolically. The Ottomans also felt that making this agreement would ensure British support on other more pressing issues, such as dealing with invasion by other European powers and conflicts in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, British pressures led the Ottomans to abandon the proposed extension of the railway line to Kuwait and instead opt for a Basra terminus. Plans for a Basra terminus created a new series of demands on behalf of the British, including the Ottoman renunciation of Qatar, and delineating its role in the wider Persian Gulf waters. Britain had wanted to conclude agreements with Sheikh of Qatar Jasim al-Thani about illicit arms traffic and maritime peace, and also sought to formally establish its dominance in the Gulf. By May 6, 1913 Britain and the Ottoman Empire initialed the compromise and the Anglo-Ottoman Convention was signed on July 29, 1913, two years exact from the first memorandum.