1939–40 Winter Offensive

1939-40 Winter Offensive
Part of Second Sino-Japanese War
Date Late November 1, 1939, to Late March 1940 Location Vicinities of Anhui, Guangdong, Hubei, Henan, Hunan, Jiangxi, Shanxi, Shandong, Suiyuan Result Chinese operational failure (due to failure to meet primary goals) Chinese Muslims rout and crush the Japanese army in Suiyuan and Henan
Belligerents
China	Japan Mengjiang
Commanders and leaders
Xue Yue Li Zongren Bai Chongxi Gu Zhutong Wei Lihuang Ma Hongbin Ma Buqing Fu Zuoyi Ma Hongkui Ma Biao	Toshizō Nishio
Strength
550,000 including Muslim Cavalry	850,000 including Mongol Cavalry
Casualties and losses
60–70,000 dead, injured or missing	20,000+ killed, 400 captured, 9 transport ships damaged and sunk

Chinese operational failure (due to failure to meet primary goals)

The 1939–40 Winter Offensive was one of the major engagements between the National Revolutionary Army and Imperial Japanese Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War, in which the Chinese forces launched their first major counter-offensive on multiple fronts. Although this offensive failed to achieve its original objectives, some studies have shown that this operation came as a heavy blow to the Japanese forces, as well as a massive shock to the Japanese military command, which did not expect the Chinese forces to be able to launch an offensive operation on such a large scale.

By April 1940, the Japanese Army had successfully forced the operation to a halt. However, a Japanese counteroffensive in the northern theater failed to seize Ningxia and was defeated in Suiyuan by Chinese Muslim forces. Muslim Cavalry under Muslim General Ma Biao destroyed Japanese armies in Henan. The Muslim General Bai Chongxi defeated the Japanese in Guangxi.

The Chinese had repulsed two Japanese offensives in the summer at the Battle of Suixian-Zaoyang and in fall at the 1st Battle of Changsha. They believed that the Japanese strength was now too dissipated to take and hold new territory and would not be able to launch large offensives unless they received more reinforcements. However defending on interior lines and with control of the lines of communication they could still shift forces and launch local offensives to damage Chinese forces or mop up guerrillas in the rear areas. Additionally during 1939, the Japanese were replacing many of their large four regiment square Divisions with the smaller three regiment triangular Divisions and weak Independent Mixed Brigades. This weakening of forces encouraged the Chinese to plan a large offensive to exploit that fact.

Chinese objective in the offensive was to take the initiative by conducting multiple front attacks to tie down the Japanese forces. They intended to use their position of exterior lines to advantage to prevent the Japanese launching new local offensives or shifting their forces to concentrate for a large offensive. The main effort was to be by 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 9th War Areas and received all the newly trained and reorganized units. Secondary efforts in support of the main efforts or as diversions were to be conducted by 1st, 4th, 8th, Shantung-Kiangsu and Hopei-Chahar War Areas with their existing units.

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Wikipedia