Yates v. United States
| Yates v. United States | |
|---|---|
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| Argued October 8–9, 1956 Decided June 17, 1957 |
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| Full case name | Yates, et al. v. United States |
| Citations | 354 U.S. 298 (more)
77 S. Ct. 1064; 1 L. Ed. 2d 1356; 1957 U.S. LEXIS 657
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| Prior history | Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit |
| Holding | |
| The Court held that to violate the Smith Act, one must encourage others to take some action, not simply hold or assert beliefs. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. | |
| Court membership | |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Harlan, joined by Warren, Frankfurter |
| Concurrence | Burton |
| Concur/dissent | Black, joined by Douglas |
| Dissent | Clark |
| Brennan, Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amend. I | |
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that the First Amendment protected radical and reactionary speech, unless it posed a "clear and present danger."
Fourteen lower echelon officials of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) were charged with violating the Smith Act by being members of the CPUSA in California. The Smith Act made it unlawful to advocate or organize the destruction or overthrow of any government in the United States by force. The appellants claimed that the Communist Party was engaged in passive political activities and that any violation of the Smith Act must involve active attempts to overthrow the government.
The Supreme Court of the United States ruled 6–1 to overturn the convictions. It construed the Smith Act narrowly, stating that the term "organize" meant to form an organization, not to take action on behalf of an organization. The Court drew a distinction between actual advocacy to action and mere belief. The Court ruled that the Smith Act did not prohibit "advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government as an abstract doctrine." The Court recognized that "advocacy to action" circumstances would be "few and far between."
Writing for the majority, Justice John Marshall Harlan introduced the notion of balancing society's right of self-preservation against the right to free speech. He wrote:
We are thus faced with the question whether the Smith Act prohibits advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle, divorced from any effort to instigate action to that end, so long as such advocacy or teaching is engaged in with evil intent. We hold that it does not.... In failing to distinguish between advocacy of forcible overthrow as an abstract doctrine and advocacy of action to that end, the District Court appears to have been led astray by the holding in Dennis that advocacy of violent action to be taken at some future time was enough.
In a concurring opinion Justice Hugo Black wrote:
Doubtlessly, dictators have to stamp out causes and beliefs which they deem subversive to their evil regimes. But governmental suppression of causes and beliefs seems to me to be the very antithesis of what our Constitution stands for. The choice expressed in the First Amendment in favor of free expression was made against a turbulent background by men such as Jefferson, Madison, and Mason – men who believed that loyalty to the provisions of this Amendment was the best way to assure a long life for this new nation and its Government.... The First Amendment provides the only kind of security system that can preserve a free government – one that leaves the way wide open for people to favor, discuss, advocate, or incite causes and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such views may be to the rest of us.
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