In decision theory, the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem shows that, under certain axioms of rational behavior, a decision-maker faced with risky (probabilistic) outcomes of different choices will behave as if he is maximizing the expected value of some function defined over the potential outcomes at some specified point in the future. This function is known as the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The theorem is the basis for expected utility theory.
In 1947, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern proved that any individual whose preferences satisfied four axioms has a utility function; such an individual's preferences can be represented on an interval scale and the individual will always prefer actions that maximize expected utility. That is, they proved that an agent is (VNM-)rational if and only if there exists a real-valued function u defined by possible outcomes such that every preference of the agent is characterized by maximizing the expected value of u, which can then be defined as the agent's VNM-utility (it is unique up to adding a constant and multiplying by a positive scalar). No claim is made that the agent has a "conscious desire" to maximize u, only that u exists.
Any individual whose preferences violate von Neumann and Morgenstern's axioms would agree to a Dutch book, which is a set of bets that necessarily leads to a loss. Therefore, it is arguable that any individual who violates the axioms is irrational. The expected utility hypothesis is that rationality can be modeled as maximizing an expected value, which given the theorem, can be summarized as "rationality is VNM-rationality".
VNM-utility is a decision utility in that it is used to describe decision preferences. It is related but not equivalent to so-called E-utilities (experience utilities), notions of utility intended to measure happiness such as that of Bentham's Greatest Happiness Principle.