Virginia v. Black
| Virginia v. Black | |
|---|---|
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| Argued December 11, 2002 Decided April 7, 2003 |
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| Full case name | Virginia v. Barry Elton Black, Richard J. Elliott, and Jonathan Oímara |
| Citations | 538 U.S. 343 (more)
123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2003)
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| Argument | Oral argument |
| Prior history | On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Virginia. Black v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 764, 553 S.E.2d 738 (2001) |
| Subsequent history | Appeal after remand at Elliott v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 464, 593 S.E.2d 263 (2004) |
| Holding | |
| Virginia's statute against cross burning is unconstitutional because it places the burden of proof on the defendant to demonstrate that he or she did not intend the cross burning as intimidation. | |
| Court membership | |
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| Case opinions | |
| Majority | O'Connor (parts I, II, III), joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Breyer |
| Concurrence | O'Connor (parts IV, V), joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Breyer |
| Concurrence | Stevens |
| Concur/dissent | Scalia, joined by Thomas (parts I, II) |
| Concur/dissent | Souter, joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg |
| Dissent | Thomas |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amend I | |
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), is a First Amendment case decided in the Supreme Court of the United States. Three defendants were convicted in two separate cases of violating a Virginia statute against cross burning. In this case, the Court struck down that statute to the extent that it considered cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate. Such a provision, the Court argued, blurs the distinction between proscribable "threats of intimidation" and the Ku Klux Klan's protected "messages of shared ideology." However, cross-burning can be a criminal offense if the intent to intimidate is proven.
In cases such as Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) and others, the Supreme Court has addressed various areas of controversial speech. The Court has frequently sided with the speakers, but occasionally the Court has sided with the government and acknowledged its (limited) power to pass laws protecting citizens from specific types of harmful speech.
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