Tank destroyer battalion (United States)

The tank destroyer battalion was a type of unit used by the United States Army during World War II. The unit was organized in one of two different forms—a towed battalion equipped with anti-tank guns, or a self-propelled battalion equipped with Self-propelled guns. The tank destroyers were formed in response to the German use of massed formations of armored units early in WW2. The tank destroyer concept envisioned the battalions acting as independent units that would respond at high speed to enemy tank attacks. In this role they would be attached to divisions or corps. In practice, they were usually attached to infantry divisions. Over one hundred battalions were formed, of which more than half saw combat service. The force was disbanded shortly after the end of the war when the concept had been shown to be unsound.

In the opening offensives of the Second World War, German doctrine - armored forces concentrated and used in a fast-moving offensive — shocked military observers. Even to armies which had previously experimented with large-scale mechanized warfare, the effects were remarkable; the collapse of Poland in 1939, followed by the defeat of the French Army and the British Expeditionary Force in France in 1940, gave rise to an impression that massed tank forces were effectively invincible when used against unprepared defenders.

Experience showed that neither infantry, anti-tank guns, or tanks, when used statically could withstand the deep envelopment maneuvers of armored "spearheads". The American armed forces, aware of the possibility of war against Germany, began to reorganize to meet this threat.

In April 1941, a conference focused on the future of antitank operations. The immediate effect was to create an anti-tank battalion in infantry divisions, but this organic anti-tank capacity was not deemed sufficient. The conference gave broad support to the idea of creating mobile anti-tank defensive units (commanded by corps or army formations) which could be deployed to meet an armored attack. The effort stalled on the issue of which branch of the Army should control it—the infantry (as a defensive role), the cavalry (as a mobile response force), or the artillery (as heavy guns). Interestingly, the armored branch did not press for control of the anti-tank units, feeling that it would be at odds with their general principles of maintaining the offensive. In May, General George C. Marshall cut through the knot by declaring the issue as sufficiently important to be dealt with as a combined-arms organization, forming an Anti-Tank Planning Board headed by Lt. Col. Andrew D. Bruce, and appointing Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair to take immediate action on organizing anti-tank forces. Three anti-tank "groups" were quickly organized, with each of three anti-tank battalions drawn from infantry divisions and various support units, and tasked with "speedy and aggressive action to search out and attack opposing tanks before they had assumed formation". In August, a plan was laid out for a program of 220 anti-tank battalions.

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