Speedy Trial Act
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 2080, as amended August 2, 1979, 93 Stat. 328, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174), establishes time limits for completing the various stages of a federal criminal prosecution.
The Act establishes time limits for completing the various stages of a federal criminal prosecution. The information or indictment must be filed within 30 days from the date of arrest or service of the summons. Trial must commence within 70 days from the date the information or indictment was filed, or from the date the defendant appears before an officer of the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later.
Moreover, in order to ensure that defendants are not rushed to trial without an adequate opportunity to prepare, Congress amended the Act in 1979 to provide a minimum time period during which trial may not commence. Thus, the Act provides that trial may not begin less than 30 days from the date the defendant first appears in court, unless the defendant agrees in writing to an earlier date. In United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231 (1985), the Supreme Court held that this 30-day trial preparation period is not restarted upon the filing of a substantially similar superseding indictment.
If the indictment is dismissed at the defendant's request, the Act's provisions apply anew upon reinstatement of the charge. If the indictment is dismissed at the request of the government, the 70-day clock is tolled during the period when no indictment is outstanding, and begins to run again upon the filing of the second indictment. If trial ends in a mistrial, or the court grants a motion for a new trial, the second trial must begin within 70 days "from the date the action occasioning the retrial becomes final."
Certain pretrial delays are automatically excluded from the Act's time limits, such as delays caused by pretrial motions. In Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 330 (1986), the Supreme Court held that § 3161 excludes "all time between the filing of a motion and the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, whether or not a delay in holding that hearing is 'reasonably necessary.'" The Act also excludes a reasonable period (up to 30 days) during which a motion is actually "under advisement" by the court. Other delays excluded from the Act's time limits include delays caused by the unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness (); delays attributable to a co-defendant (); and delays attributable to the defendant's involvement in other proceedings, including delay resulting from an interlocutory appeal. (Note, however, that the 30-day defense preparation period provided for in is calculated without reference to Section exclusions).
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