Pleiku Campaign
| Pleiku Campaign | |||||||
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| Part of the Vietnam War | |||||||
 Bruce P. Crandall's UH-1 Huey helicopter and U.S. Army Air Cavalrymen under fire at LZ X-Ray |
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 South Vietnam United States
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 North Vietnam Viet Cong
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| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Vĩnh Lộc (ARVN III Corps) Stanley Larsen (IFFV HQ) Harry Kinnard (1ACD HQ) Richard Knowles (1ACD FCP) Harlow Clark (1st AC Brigade) Ray Lynch (2nd AC Brigade) Thomas W. Brown (3rd AC Brigade) Harold G. Moore (1/7) Robert McDade (2/7) Walter B. Tully (2/5) |
Chu Huy Mân (B3 Field Front) Nguyễn Hữu An (Fwd CP) Tô Định Khẩn (32nd Rgt) Vũ Sắc (33rd Rgt) Lê Tiến Hòa (66th Rgt) Phạm Công Cửu (66th Deputy Cmdr) † Lã Ngọc Châu (7/66) Lê Xuân Phôi (8/66) † Nguyễn Văn Định (9/66) |
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| Units involved | |||||||
| II Corps Force; 1st Air Cavalry Division; 3AC B-52 bombers (Guam). | B3 Field Front Force | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| ~600 | ~6.000 | ||||||
The Pleiku Campaign took place from 23 October to 26 November 1965. II Corps Command named it Pleime Campaign, with a slightly different starting date of 20 October instead of 23 consisted of three operations:
This joint ARVN-US Campaign was characterized by a special procedure of "common operational concept, common intelligence, common reserve, and separate command".
In July 1965, General Chu Huy Man was assigned commander of B3 Field Front in preparation for the Winter-Spring 1965 Campaign to conquer the Central Highlands.
The B3 Field Front Command employed three regiments in the effort to conquer the Central Highlands: the 32nd to set up the ambush to destroy the ARVN relief column; the 33rd to put a siege of the Pleime camps; and the 66th to join force with the 32nd and 33rd to overrun Pleiku city.
The North Vietnamese Communist Government got help from the Chinese Communist Government in terms of military, financial aid, and Chinese advisors.
A Chinese Advisors Group established its headquarters in Phnom Penh to coordinate the logistics aspect of the NVA Pleime attack.
In the exercise of the Campaign, II Corps Command had a unique source of intelligence. This intelligence source consisted of radio intercepts of the communications between the Chinese Advisors that II Corps Command alluded to as "Special Agents". LTC Hal Moore got a sample of this type of intelligence in the Mandarin dialect on the eve of the LZ X-Ray air assault,
It allowed the planning for every aspect of the operations on "current(real-time) intelligence". It also permitted the accurate scheduling of the B-52 strikes.
This unique source of intelligence was generated at J2/MACV level (Brigadier General McChristian) and disseminated to G2/ACDF (Brigadier General Knowles) through the channel of G2/IFFV (Major General Larsen).
In September 1965, prior to attack of the Pleime camp, a B-52 strike - to destroy the NVA B3 Field Front Forces comprising the three 32nd, 33rd and 66th Regiments as they assembled in the bases set up in the Chu Pong areas to stage the attack of the Pleime camp scheduled for December 1962, - was in the planning on the desk of J2/MACV.
When the B3 Field Command decided for an earlier attack on 19 October with only the 32nd and the 33rd, the plan was modified with the introduction of Operation Dân Thắng 21 (Pleime) and Operation Long Reach (Chupong) with the purpose to allowing the three 32nd, 33rd and 66th to regroup as available targets for B-52 bombers. The plan was code-named "Plei Me/Chupong Campaign" and narrated in Brigadier General McChristian's report, "Intelligence Aspect of Plei Me/Chu Pong Campaign".
A target becomes available for B-52 strike when it can be pinpointed in a one square kilometer spot. On November 11, intelligence source notified Brigadier Knowles all three NVA regiments had assembled within one square kilometer area with the 66th being the last one reaching that condition (center of mass Vic YA 9104), and the 32nd (YA 820070) and the 33rd (YA 940010) less than one square kilometer. It was on that day that Brigadier General Knowles presented the original B-52 strike plan of J2/MACV through Major General Larsen to Brigadier General DePuy in order for the chief J3/MACV to execute the B-52 strike.
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