Perpetual warfare

Perpetual war, endless war, or a forever war, is a lasting state of war with no clear conditions that would lead to its conclusion. These wars are situations of ongoing tension that may escalate at any moment, similar to the Cold War. Today, the concepts are used to critique the United States Armed Forces interventions in foreign nations and the military–industrial complex, or wars with ambiguous enemies such as the War on Terror or the War on Drugs.

The concept of a Forever War has been used in opposition to United States military involvement since the Vietnam War. James Pinckney Harrison argues in The Endless War: Fifty Years of Struggle in Vietnam (1981) that the Vietnam War was "endless" due to the success of the communist revolution in nationalizing the people. The concept was used by Trần Văn Đôn, a general in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, in his book Our Endless War: Inside Vietnam (1978) .

American historian James Chace argues in his book Endless War: How we got involved in Central America (1983) argues that US policy in Central America is based upon the assumption that US hegemony is threatened within the region. According to Chace, US involvement in Central America worked towards resisting the domino effect of the spread of a "communist take-over," largely through establishing the credibility of US military. Though these policies were meant to deter conflict, they themselves created the conditions for instability in the region, which furthered a US response. This resulted in a self-perpetuating, or "endless," loop. He additionally argues US investment in pursuing an expanding military presence in Central America reflects an endless preparation for war.

A key argument of Chace is that much this military involvement stems from a logic of US paranoia in reaction to the Cuban Revolution. A similar argument is put forward by David Keen, political economist and Professor of Complex Emergencies at the London School of Economics. His book Endless War? Hidden Function of the 'War on Terror' (2006) argues that the United States' strategies and tactics in the War On Terror use a "militaristic state-cased framework." This framework, though "counterproductive," has an "inner logic" and a "psychological function" of responding to the trauma of 9/11.

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