Pepper v Hart | |
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Court | House of Lords |
Full case name | Pepper (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) v Hart |
Decided | 26 November 1992 |
Citation(s) |
[1992] UKHL 3 [1993] AC 593 [1992] 3 WLR 1032 |
Transcript(s) | Full text of judgment |
Case history | |
Prior action(s) | High Court of Justice ([1990] 1 WLR 204) |
Appealed from | Court of Appeal ([1991] Ch 203) |
Case opinions | |
Lord Browne-Wilkinson (supported by Lords Keith, Griffiths, Ackner, Bridge and Oliver) Lord Mackay (dissenting) |
|
Court membership | |
Judges sitting |
Lord Mackay Lord Keith Lord Bridge Lord Griffiths Lord Ackner Lord Oliver Lord Browne-Wilkinson |
Keywords | |
Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1992] UKHL 3, is a landmark decision of the House of Lords on the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. The court established the principle that when primary legislation is ambiguous then, in certain circumstances, the court may refer to statements made in the House of Commons or House of Lords in an attempt to interpret the meaning of the legislation. Before this ruling, such an action would have been seen as a breach of parliamentary privilege.
John Hart and nine others were teachers at Malvern College who benefited from a "concessionary fee" scheme that allowed their children to be educated at the college for one fifth of the normal fees of a pupil. The Inland Revenue attempted to tax this benefit based on the Finance Act 1976. There was a dispute over the correct interpretation of the Act. The Special Commissioners charged with assessing the tax found in favour of Hart, but both the High Court of Justice and Court of Appeal of England and Wales found in favour of the Inland Revenue. The case then went to the House of Lords, which, making use of statements in Parliament as recorded in Hansard, found in favour of Hart. Lord Mackay, dissenting, argued that Hansard should not be considered admissible evidence because of the time and expense involved in a lawyer having to look up every debate and discussion on a particular statute when giving legal advice or preparing a case.