Maher al-Assad ماهر الاسد |
|
---|---|
Nickname(s) | 'Chief' |
Born |
Damascus, Syria |
8 December 1967
Allegiance | Syria |
Service/branch | Syrian Arab Army |
Years of service | 1988–present |
Rank | Brigadier general |
Commands held |
Republican Guard 4th Armoured Division |
Battles/wars | |
Spouse(s) | Manal al-Jadaan |
Relations | Hafez al-Assad (father) Bushra al-Assad (sister) Bassel al-Assad (brother) Bashar al-Assad (brother) Majd al-Assad (brother) Jamil al-Assad (uncle) Rifaat al-Assad (uncle) |
Maher al-Assad (Arabic: ماهر الأسد, born 8 December 1967) is a Syrian general and commander of the Republican Guard and the army's elite Fourth Armored Division, which together with Syria's secret police form the core of the country's security forces. He is also a member of the Central Committee of the Ba'ath Party's Syrian Regional Branch. He is thought by some to be the second most powerful man in Syria after his brother Bashar, the current President.
Maher al-Assad was born on 8 December 1967, the youngest child of Anisa Makhlouf and Hafez al-Assad. He was just two years old when his father became President of Syria. Like the other children in the al-Assad family, he was raised out of the public spotlight and trained in Syria.
Maher went to the Academy of Freedom School for his secondary education and then studied business administration at Damascus University. Following university he pursued a career in the military like his older brother Bassel.
When Bassel died in a car crash in 1994, Maher was mentioned as a possible successor to Hafez, but in the end, Bashar succeeded his father even though he lacked the military experience and political ambition. It was speculated that Maher's reputation as a hot-tempered person influenced the decision in favour of Bashar.
Maher al-Assad operates a number of different business projects in Lebanon with his cousin Rami Makhlouf. There are reports of tensions between the two, which is considered why parts of the Makhlouf business were shifted in 2005 to Dubai. Shmuel Bar argues that the transfers were made because the Makhloufs were worried that they were going to be made the scapegoats of an anti-corruption propaganda campaign.