Long-arm jurisdiction is the ability of local courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign ("foreign" meaning out of jurisdiction, whether a state, province, or nation) defendants, whether on a statutory basis or through a court's inherent jurisdiction (depending on the jurisdiction). This jurisdiction permits a court to hear a case against a defendant and enter a binding judgment against a defendant residing outside the jurisdiction concerned.
At heart, the constraints on long arm jurisdiction are concepts of international law, and the principle that one country ought not exercise state power over the territory of another unless some recognized exception applies. In municipal law, the authority of a court to exercise long-arm jurisdiction must be based upon some action of the defendant which subjects him or her to the jurisdiction of the court.
The United States Supreme Court, in International Shoe v. Washington and later on in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, has held that a person must have minimum contacts with a State, in order for a court in one state to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant from another state. As the Court noted in the latter case,
As has long been settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the forum State.... The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.