Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services
| Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services | |
|---|---|
No. 01-16723
|
|
| Court | United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit |
| Full case name | Steven Lofton, et al. v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services, et al |
| Decided | January 28, 2004 |
| Citation(s) | 358 F.3d 804 |
| Case history | |
| Subsequent action(s) |
U.S. Supreme Court |
| Holding | |
| Florida's ban on homosexuals adopting children is constitutional | |
| Court membership | |
| Judge(s) sitting | Stanley F. Birch, Jr., Edward Earl Carnes, Procter Ralph Hug, Jr. |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Burch joined by unanimous |
U.S. Supreme Court
Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services, is a decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upholding Florida's ban of adoption of children by homosexual persons as enforced by the Florida Department of Children and Families.
The plaintiffs applied for adoptions and their applications were rejected because they were homosexuals. Four of the plaintiffs were legal guardians or foster parents of the children, who were also plaintiffs. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, asking it to enjoin enforcement of the law. They also sought class certification for all persons similarly situated.
The court considered five questions on whether the law violated:
On August 21, 2001 District court judge James Lawrence King rejected class certification and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants.
The Court noted that "adoption is not a right; it is a statutory privilege" and that adoption is wholly a creature of the state. It then noted that in "formulating its adoption policies and procedures, the State of Florida acts in the protective and provisional role of in loco parentis for those children who, because of various circumstances, have become wards of the state. Thus, adoption law is unlike criminal law, for example, where the paramount substantive concern is not intruding on individuals' liberty interests" and that it is "also distinct from such contexts as government-benefit eligibility schemes or access to a public forum, where equality of treatment is the primary concern." The Court held that "the state's overriding interest is the best interests of the children whom it is seeking to place with adoptive families", and "the state can make classifications for adoption purposes that would be constitutionally suspect in many other arenas".
Because adoption is a public act, the plaintiffs-appellants were "asking the state to confer official recognition — and, consequently, the highest level of constitutional insulation from subsequent state interference". The Court noted that "appellants have not cited to us, nor have we found, a single precedent in which the Supreme Court or one of our sister circuits has sustained a constitutional challenge to an adoption scheme or practice by any individual other than a natural parent, and even many challenges by natural parents have failed".
...
Wikipedia