Law and Corpus Linguistics

Law and corpus linguistics (LCL) is a new academic sub-discipline that uses large databases of examples of language usage equipped with tools designed by linguists called corpora to better get at the meaning of words and phrases in legal texts (statutes, constitutions, contracts, etc.). Thus, LCL is the application of corpus linguistic tools, theories, and methodologies to issues of legal interpretation in much the same way law and economics is the application of economic tools, theories, and methodologies to various legal issues.

A 2005 law review article by Lawrence Solan noted in passing that corpus linguistics had potential for its application to interpreting legal texts. But the first systematic exploration and advocacy of applying the tools and methodologies of corpus linguistics to legal interpretive questions of law and corpus linguistics came in the fall of 2010, when the BYU Law Review published a note by Stephen Mouritsen, entitled The Dictionary is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning. The note argued that dictionaries are the primary linguistic tool used by judges to determine the plain or ordinary meaning of words and phrases, and highlighted the deficiencies of such an approach. In its stead, the note proposed using corpus linguistics. And the note would be later cited by Adam Liptak in a New York Times article on statutory construction.

Law and corpus linguistics (LCL) gained greater legitimacy in July 2011 with the first judicial opinion in American history utilizing corpus linguistics to determine the meaning of a legal text: In re the Adoption of Baby E.Z. In a concurrence in part and in the judgment, Justice Thomas Lee wrote to put forth an alternative ground for the majority's holding—interpreting the phrase "custody determination" by using corpus linguistics. Justice Lee looked at 500 randomized sample sentences from the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) and found that the most common sense of "custody" was in the context of divorce rather than adoption. Further, he found that "custody" is ten times more likely to co-occur (or collocate) with "divorce" than with "adoption". From that evidence Justice Lee concluded that he "would find that the custody proceedings covered by the Act are limited to proceedings resulting in the modifiable custody orders of a divorce", rather than the broader range of custody proceedings.

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