Larry Laudan
| Larry Laudan | |
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| Born |
16 October 1941 Austin, Texas |
| Nationality | United States |
| Alma mater | University of Kansas (B.A. Physics, 1962); Princeton University (Ph.D. Philosophy, 1965) |
| Era | Contemporary philosophy |
| Region | Western Philosophy |
| School | Pragmatism |
| Institutions | University of Pittsburgh, Virginia Tech, University of Hawaii, University of Texas Law School, UNAM |
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Main interests
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Philosophy of science, epistemology |
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Notable ideas
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The concept "scientific research traditions," criticism of positivism, realism, and relativism |
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Influences
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Influenced
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Larry Laudan (/ˈlɔːdən/; born 1941) is a contemporary American philosopher of science and epistemologist. He has strongly criticized the traditions of positivism, realism, and relativism, and he has defended a view of science as a privileged and progressive institution against popular challenges. Laudan's philosophical view of "research traditions" is seen as an important alternative to Imre Lakatos's "research programs."
Laudan took his PhD in Philosophy at Princeton University, and then taught at University College London and, for many years, at the University of Pittsburgh. Subsequently he taught at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, University of Hawaii and the National Autonomous University of Mexico. He presently teaches at the University of Texas, Austin. His more recent work has been on legal epistemology.
Laudan's most influential book is Progress and its Problems (1977), in which he charges philosophers of science with paying lip service to the view that "science is fundamentally a problem-solving activity" without taking seriously the view's implications for the history of science and its philosophy, and without questioning certain issues in the historiography and methodology of science. Against empiricism, which is represented by Karl Popper, and "revolutionism," represented by Thomas Kuhn, Laudan maintained in Progress and its Problems that science is an evolving process that accumulates more empirically validated evidence while solving conceptual anomalies at the same time. Mere evidence collecting or empirical confirmation does not constitute the true mechanism of scientific advancement; conceptual resolution and comparison of the solutions of anomalies provided by various theories form an indispensable part of the evolution of science.
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