Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
| Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. | |
|---|---|
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| Argued February 28, 2012 Reargued October 1, 2012 Decided April 17, 2013 |
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| Full case name | Kiobel, Individually and on behalf of her late husband Kiobel, et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al. |
| Docket nos. | 10–1491 |
| Citations | 569 U.S. _____ (more) |
| Argument | Oral argument |
| Reargument | Reargument |
| Prior history | Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); affirmed in part, reversed in part, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010); rehearing en banc denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2011); certiorari granted, 132 S.Ct. 472 (2010) |
| Holding | |
| The presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the Alien Tort Statute | |
| Court membership | |
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| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Roberts, joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito |
| Concurrence | Kennedy |
| Concurrence | Alito, joined by Thomas |
| Concurrence | Breyer, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan |
| Laws applied | |
| Alien Tort Statute | |
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013), was a United States Supreme Court decision in which the court found that the Alien Tort Claims Act presumptively does not apply extraterritorially.
The plaintiffs in Kiobel were citizens of Nigeria who claimed that Dutch, British, and Nigerian oil-exploration corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government during the 1990s in committing violations of customary international law. The plaintiffs claimed that Royal Dutch Shell compelled its Nigerian subsidiary, in cooperation with the Nigerian government, to brutally crush peaceful resistance to aggressive oil development in the Ogoni Niger River Delta. Plaintiffs sought damages under the ATS. The defendants moved to dismiss based on a two-pronged argument. First, they argued that customary international law itself provides the rules by which to decide whether conduct violates the law of nations where non-state actors are alleged to have committed the wrong in question. Second, they contended that no norm has ever existed between nations that imposes liability upon corporate actors. On September 29, 2006, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting property destruction; forced exile; extrajudicial killing; and violation of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association. It reasoned that customary international law did not define those violations with sufficient particularity. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to the remaining claims of aiding and abetting arbitrary arrest and detention; crimes against humanity; and torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. The district court then certified its entire order for interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit based on the serious nature of the questions at issue.
In a 2–1 decision issued on September 17, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that corporations cannot be held liable for violations of customary international law, finding that: (1) under both U.S. Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedents over the previous 30 years that address ATS suits alleging violations of customary international law, the scope of liability is determined by customary international law itself; (2) under Supreme Court precedent, the ATS requires courts to apply norms of international law—and not domestic law—to the scope of defendants' liabilities. Such norms must be "specific, universal and obligatory"; and (3) under international law, "corporate liability is not a discernible—much less a universally recognized—norm of customary international law", that the court could apply to the ATS, and that the plaintiffs' ATS claims should indeed be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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