The Johnson-McConnell agreement of 1966 was an agreement between United States Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson and United States Air Force Chief of Staff General John P. McConnell on 6 April 1966. The U.S. Army agreed to give up its fixed-wing tactical airlift aircraft, while the U.S. Air Force relinquished its claim to most forms of rotary wing aircraft. The most immediate effect was the transfer of Army DHC-4 Caribou aircraft to the Air Force.
The value of tactical air transport had been demonstrated in World War II, proving especially valuable in mountainous and jungle regions of the China-Burma-India and Southwest Pacific theaters. In the 1950s, U.S. Air Force recognized this, and emphasised centralized management and control of airlift resources. At the same time, Army theorists considered the possibility of employing aircraft in the traditional roles of cavalry. In the Army's concept, aircraft were responsible to and under the command of the ground commanders. From the Air Force perspective,
"The Army is not capitalising on the inherent flexibility of air power. It still wants to use aircraft as artillery pieces having them on call at all levels of command."
By 1960, the U.S. Army had 5,500 aircraft, and planned to acquire over 250 CV-2 Caribou aircraft (de Havilland Canada DHC-4 Caribou). The Army's 1962 Howze Board strongly endorsed the airmobility concept, calling for the creation of air assault divisions equipped with organic aircraft, supported by air transport brigades equipped with heavy helicopters and Caribou transports. To the Air Force, this sounded suspiciously like the Army creating a tactical air force of its own.