Instrumental rationality

People reason daily, individually and in groups, about what they ought to do and how they ought to act. They seek to obey legitimate rules thought of as ends, and to use efficient tools as means. Philosophers and social scientists label this reasoning capacity "rationality," and assign supreme importance to understanding it, as the following quotes suggest:

The rationality of beliefs and actions is a theme usually dealt with in philosophy. One could even say that philosophical thought originates in reflection on the reason embodied in cognition, speech, and action; and reason remains its basic theme.

Rationality provides us with the (potential) power to investigate and discover anything and everything; it enables us to control and direct our behavior through reasons and the utilization of principles.

Rationality is interpreted here ... as the discipline of subjecting one's choices—of actions as well as of objectives, values and priorities—to reasoned scrutiny.

Since antiquity, scholars have divided rationality in two, distinguishing good reason for means from good reasons for ends. Following the usage of German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920), these capacities are often labeled instrumental rationality and value rationality. Here are Weber's original definitions:

Social action, like all action, may be...: (1) instrumentally rational (Zweckrational), that is, determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as "conditions" or "means" for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends; (2) value-rational (Wertrational), that is, determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success; ...

Cognitive scientists have renewed and revised these labels in their "Great Rationality Debate." "Instrumental rationality" remains close to Weber's definition, but his "value-rationality" is now labeled "epistemic rationality," meaning immediate knowledge.

Examples of these two kinds of rationality and their incompatible prescription of action are everywhere, although they rarely bear Weber's labels. In foreign policy debates, "realists" reason instrumentally that defending human rights is occasionally a practical means, while "idealists" reason that defending human rights is intrinsically legitimate. Debates over abortion policy find instrumental "pro-choice" parties reasoning that the procedure is sometimes a necessary means, while value-rational "pro-life" parties assert it is intrinsically sinful murder. In environment policy, instrumentally rational scientists face off against value rational science-deniers claiming their moral right to traditional beliefs. Instrumental rationalists call their opponents irrational and impractical. Value rationalists call their opponents unprincipled opportunists. But in every case, all parties claim to be rational.

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