Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

In contract law, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a general presumption that the parties to a contract will deal with each other honestly, fairly, and in good faith, so as to not destroy the right of the other party or parties to receive the benefits of the contract. It is implied in every contract in order to reinforce the express covenants or promises of the contract. A lawsuit (or a cause of action) based upon the breach of the covenant may arise when one party to the contract attempts to claim the benefit of a technical excuse for breaching the contract, or when he or she uses specific contractual terms in isolation in order to refuse to perform his or her contractual obligations, despite the general circumstances and understandings between the parties.

In U.S. law, the legal concept of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arose in the mid-19th century because contemporary legal interpretations of “the express contract language, interpreted strictly, appeared to grant unbridled discretion to one of the parties”. In 1933, in the case of Kirke La Shelle Company v. The Paul Armstrong Company et al. 263 N.Y. 79; 188 N.E. 163; 1933 N.Y., the New York Court of Appeals said:

In every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything, which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party, to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Furthermore, the covenant was discussed in the First Restatement of Contracts by the American Law Institute, but before adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in the 1950s, the common law of most states did not recognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contracts.

In the Indian Penal Code, "good faith" is defined under Section 52 as Nothing is said to be done or believed in “good faith” which is done or believed without due care and attention.[1]</ref> The Privy Council expanded on this meaning in the case of Muhammad Ishaq v. The Emperor (1914), in which it held that an action taken by the defendant based on a belief of having a decree passed in his favour, was illegal since he could have found out that he in fact did not enjoy any such favourable decree, if he had inquired with a little more care and attention.[2]</ref>

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