Gjørv Report

The Gjørv Report (Gjørv-rapporten or NOU 2012: 14, Rapport fra 22. juli-kommisjonen) is a report that was ordered by Norway's parliament, as a consequence of the 2011 Oslo bombing and the following Utøya massacre. The report was delivered to Norway's prime minister on 13 August 2012, one year after the establishment of a fact finding commission headed by Alexandra Bech Gjørv. The report found that police could have prevented the bombing, could have arrived on Utøya Island sooner and caught Anders Breivik faster. It also concluded that Anders Breivik could have been stopped from carrying out the Utøya massacre.

The Gjørv Report has 482 pages and was compiled by a ten-person commission which was chaired by lawyer and former Statoil ASA executive Alexandra Bech Gjørv and also included the former head of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, academics, executives as well as police officials from neighboring Denmark and Finland. The report used data from global positioning systems (GPS), photos, film and audio files in addition to reports and interviews.

The report found that 1.) the attack on the government complex in Oslo could have been prevented by effective implementation of security measures that had already been approved, 2.) a more rapid police operation to protect people on Utøya Island was a realistic possibility and the gunman could have been stopped earlier on 22 July (up to half an hour sooner) and 3.) more security and emergency measures to prevent further attacks and "mitigate adverse effects" should have been implemented on 22 July. The commission also lamented police shortcomings before and during the Utøya shooting, noting the tardiness with which the description of Breivik and his vehicle were released, communication problems, failure to follow procedures, and inadequate means, among other things. "All in all, July 22 revealed serious shortfalls in society's emergency preparedness and ability to avert threats," the commission said. Police should have automatically activated drills meant to guard against multiple attacks but weak leadership and disorganization led to delays the report said. The military was not immediately informed, police could not find a working helicopter to reach Utøya Island, and its boat, intended to transport special forces to the island, could not carry the necessary load. "The challenges turned out to be ascribable to leadership and communication to a far greater extent than to the lack of response personnel," it said.

Alexandra Bech Gjørv, chairman of the 22 July Commission, said a failure to mobilise helicopters, share information or accept help from private individuals prepared to drive boats to Utøya contributed to "the most inconceivable brutality". "We have seen there are good plans ... but authorities have not learned enough from exercises conducted or implemented approved measures," Gjørv told reporters. The commission also noted a "serious need for change" of emergency preparedness routines, she said. The perpetrator of the attacks was, however, "to be blamed for the loss of lives", Gjørv said.

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