Fact–value distinction

The fact-value distinction is the distinction between things that can be known to be true and things that are the personal preferences of individuals.

The fact-value distinction emerged in philosophy in the Enlightenment. In particular, David Hume (1711–1776) argued that human beings are unable to ground normative arguments in positive arguments, that is, to derive ought from is. Hume was a skeptic, and although a complex and dedicated philosopher, he shared a political viewpoint with early Enlightenment philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and John Locke (1632–1704). Specifically, Hume, at least to some extent, argued that religious and national hostilities that divided European society were based on unfounded beliefs. In effect, he argued they are not found in nature, but are a human creation, depending on a particular time and place, and thus unworthy of mortal conflict.

The fact-value distinction is closely related to the naturalistic fallacy, a topic debated in ethical and moral philosophy. G.E. Moore believed it essential to all ethical thinking. However, more recent contemporary philosophers like Phillipa Foot have called into question the validity of such assumptions. Others, such as Ruth Anna Putnam, argue that even the most "scientific" of disciplines are affected by the "values" of those who research and practice the vocation. Nevertheless, the difference between the naturalistic fallacy and the fact-value distinction is derived from the manner in which modern social science has used the fact-value distinction, and not the strict naturalistic fallacy to articulate new fields of study and create academic disciplines.

The fact-value distinction is also closely related to the moralistic fallacy, an invalid inference of factual conclusions from purely evaluative premises. For example, an invalid inference "Because everybody ought to be equal, there are no innate genetic differences between people" is an instance of the moralistic fallacy. As for the naturalistic fallacy one attempts to move from an "is" to an "ought" statement, with the moralistic fallacy one attempts to move from an "ought" to an "is" statement.

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