Extrinsic value

Instrumental and intrinsic value are technical labels for the two poles of an ancient dichotomy. People seem to reason differently about what they ought to do (good ends) and what they are able to do (good means). When people reason about ends, they apply the criterion intrinsic value. When they reason about means they apply the criterion instrumental value. Few question the existence of these two criteria, but their relative authority is in constant dispute.

This article explains the meaning of and disputes about these two criteria for judging means and ends. Evidence is drawn from the work of four scholars. John Dewey and John Fagg Foster provided arguments against the dichotomy, while Jacques Ellul and Anjan Chakravartty provided arguments in its favor.

The word "value" is both a verb and a noun, each having multiple meanings. But its root meaning always involves normative qualities such as goodness, worth, truth. The word reports either the rational act of judging or individual results of judging the presence of such qualities.;

Judgments of normative qualities are commonly believed to be rationally authorized by two distinct criteria applied to two distinct realities, one static, the other dynamic. People reason about 1) what they ought to do—intrinsically legitimate ends—and 2) how they ought to do—conditionally efficient means. Ends are stereotypical rules for action, judged unconditionally legitimate in themselves; for example the Ten Commandments and the Second Amendment to the US Constitution. Means are constantly evolving tools, designed to work efficiently in various conditions; for example, scientific and technological theories. The existence of these two criteria is rarely questioned, but their relative authority is in constant dispute.

Following the usage of German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), these two criteria authorizing normative judgments are commonly labeled "instrumental value"(dynamically efficient means) and "intrinsic value" (statically legitimate ends). Here are Weber's original definitions, followed by current labels for the two criteria from the Oxford Handbook of Value Theory.

Social action, like all action, may be [judged] ...:

1) instrumentally rational (zweckrational), that is, determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment of other human beings; these expectations are used as "conditions" or "means" for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends'

2) value-rational (wertrational), that is, determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success;...,

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