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Export of cryptography from the United States


The export of cryptographic technology and devices from the United States was severely restricted by U.S. law until 1992, but was gradually eased until 2000; some restrictions still remain.

Since World War II, many governments, including the U.S. and its NATO allies, have regulated the export of cryptography for national security reasons, and, as late as 1992, cryptography was on the U.S. Munitions List as an Auxiliary Military Equipment.

Due to the enormous impact of cryptanalysis in World War II, these governments saw the military value in denying current and potential enemies access to cryptographic systems. Since the U.S. and U.K. believed they had better cryptographic capabilities than others, their intelligence agencies tried to control all dissemination of the more effective crypto techniques. They also wished to monitor the diplomatic communications of other nations, including those emerging in the post-colonial period and whose position on Cold War issues was vital.

The First Amendment made controlling all use of cryptography inside the U.S. illegal, but controlling access to U.S. developments by others was more practical — there were no constitutional impediments.

Accordingly, regulations were introduced as part of munitions controls which required licenses to export cryptographic methods (and even their description); the regulations established that cryptography beyond a certain strength (defined by algorithm and length of key) would not be licensed for export except on a case-by-case basis. This policy was also adopted elsewhere for various reasons.

The development and public release of Data Encryption Standard (DES) and asymmetric key techniques in the 1970s, the rise of the Internet, and the willingness of some to risk and resist prosecution, eventually made this policy impossible to enforce, and by the late 1990s it was being relaxed in the U.S., and to some extent (e.g., France) elsewhere. As late as 1997, NSA officials in the US were concerned that the widespread use of strong encryption will frustrate their ability to provide SIGINT regarding foreign entities, including terrorist groups operating internationally. NSA officials anticipated that the American encryption software backed by an extensive infrastructure, when marketed, was likely to become a standard for international communications. In 1997, Louis Freeh, then the Director of the FBI, said


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