Ecological rationality

Ecological rationality is a particular account of practical rationality, which specifies the norms of rational action – what one ought to do in order to be rational. The presently dominant account of practical rationality, rational choice theory, maintains that practical rationality consists in making decisions in accordance with certain rules, irrespective of context. Ecological rationality, in contrast, claims that the rationality of a particular decision depends on the circumstances in which it takes place. What is considered rational under the rational choice account thus might not be considered rational under the 'ecological rationality' account, and vice versa.

Ecological rationality challenges rational choice theory (RCT) as a normative account of rationality. According to rational choice theory, an action is considered rational if the action follows from preferences and expectations that satisfy a set of principles. These principles are often justified based on consistency considerations – for example, intransitive preferences and expectations inconsistent with available information are ruled out. Rational choice theory therefore cashes out practical rationality as the optimal path of action given one's subjective representation of reality.

Since the second half of the 20th century, a body of research documented a collection of systematic violations of the principles of RCT. These violations are widely interpreted as demonstrations of irrationalities in human behavior. In contrast, the notion of Ecological Rationality questions the normative validity of RCT and therefore interprets the empirical findings in fundamentally different way.

Gerd Gigerenzer argues that some observed behavior, although violating RCT principles, might be rational in environments with specific characteristics. That is, one ought to violate the principles of RCT in order to act rationally in these environments. This idea, that the rationality of an action not only depends on internal criteria (e.g., preference consistency) but also on the structure of the environment, was proposed earlier by Herbert A. Simon. Simon envisioned rationality as being shaped by a pair of scissors that cuts with two blades – one representing the structure of the task environment, the other the computational capacities of the agent.

...
Wikipedia