Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group
| Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group | |
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| Argued March 20, 1978 Decided June 26, 1978 |
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| Full case name | Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., et al. |
| Citations | 438 U.S. 59 (more)
98 S. Ct. 2620; 57 L. Ed. 2d 595; 1978 U.S. LEXIS 38; 11 ERC (BNA) 1753; 8 ELR 20545; 8 ELR 20545
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| Prior history | Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina |
| Holding | |
| The Price Anderson Act does not violate equal protection by treating victims of nuclear accidents differently from the victims of other industrial accidents. | |
| Court membership | |
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| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Burger, joined by Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell |
| Concurrence | Stewart |
| Concurrence | Rehnquist, joined by Stevens |
| Concurrence | Stevens |
| Laws applied | |
| Price Anderson Act; Fourteenth Amendment | |
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court overturned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision that the Price Anderson Act violated equal protection by treating victims of nuclear accidents differently from the victims of other industrial accidents.
Several groups filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, regarding the Price Anderson Act. The suit challenged it on two grounds; it violated the Fifth Amendment because it dis not ensure adequate compensation for victims of accidents, and it violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it treated nuclear accidents differently from other accidents.
The Court found that the differential treatments of industrial victims did not constitute a violation of equal protection, based on the reasons Congress gave for liability limitations: "There is no equal protection violation, since the general rationality of the Act's liability limitation, particularly with reference to the congressional purpose of encouraging private participation in the exploitation of nuclear energy, is ample justification for the difference in treatment between those injured in nuclear accidents and those whose injuries are derived from other causes."
The court summarised the circumstances leading up to the act:
The court also concluded:
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