Defense of Schwedt Bridgehead

Part of World War II

Date	February 1 – March 3, 1945
Location	Schwedt, Germany
Result	Successful Soviet deception

Belligerents

9th Army Germany

2nd Belorussian Front, Soviet Union

Commanders and leaders

Heinrich Himmler
Otto Skorzeny

Konstantin Rokossovsky

Strength

Originally a Kampfgruppe, later XI SS Panzer Corps

Deception by 2nd Guards Tank Army, supported by 61st and 49th Armies

The defense of the Schwedt bridgehead was a German 3rd Panzer Army operation on the Eastern Front during the final months of World War II. German forces, commanded by Otto Skorzeny, were ordered to prepare to conduct a counter-offensive. However they were forced to hold a bridgehead against expected numerically superior forces of the Soviet 2nd Belorussian Front (Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky) for 31 days. Their position was largely ignored during the Red Army's Cottbus-Potsdam Offensive Operation which breached German defenses at Gartz to the north of Schwedt. This was unexpected because it required the Red Army to cross the Randowbruch Swamp that lay between the Oder and Randow rivers.

The Germans feared that the advancing Red Army would cross the frozen Oder at Schwedt, about 60 miles north-east of Berlin. The Commander-in-chief of Army Group Vistula, Heinrich Himmler, was planning a counter-offensive from Schwedt. On January 30, 1945, he ordered SS-Standartenführer Otto Skorzeny to prepare for the offensive.

The rapid advance of the Red Army meant that when Skorzeny set up his command post on the right bank of the Oder in Niederkränig (some three kilometers south-east of Schwedt), rather than preparing for a counter-offensive, he was forced to order that the first week be spent by troops of the newly created 11th Army preparing fortified positions while others were concentrated for the offensive. The position was prepared according to typical Wehrmacht doctrine some 20 km forward of the river, and strengthened with machine gun nests and reinforced trenches.

Despite ostensibly preparing for an offensive, the 3rd Panzer Army troops, including the X SS Corps, were short of supplies and weapons, lacking heavy machine guns and artillery. Makeshift artillery was produced by mounting anti-aircraft guns on trucks. It proved useful in harassing the Red Army's 61st Army by giving them the impression that the Germans had large artillery units. After the ice on the Oder was blown up by pioneers to make crossing more difficult for the advancing Red Army tanks, a similar strategy was employed using guns mounted on river barges. Skorzeny later credited this use of mobile artillery with gaining enough time to sufficiently fortify the bridgehead. The initial troops began to arrive early in February from the Courland Pocket, they included the 4th Panzer Division, the 32nd and 227th Infantry divisions, elements of the XVI SS Corps, and other SS units.

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Wikipedia