Craig v. Boren | |
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Argued October 5, 1976 Decided December 20, 1976 |
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Full case name | Craig et al. v. Boren, Governor of Oklahoma, et al. |
Citations | 429 U.S. 190 (more)
97 S. Ct. 451; 50 L. Ed. 2d 397; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 183
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Holding | |
To regulate in a sex-discriminatory fashion, the government must demonstrate that its use of sex-based criteria is substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives. | |
Court membership | |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Brennan, joined by White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens |
Concurrence | Blackmun |
Concurrence | Stewart |
Concurrence | Stevens |
Concurrence | Powell |
Dissent | Burger |
Dissent | Rehnquist |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. XIV | |
This case overturned a previous ruling or rulings
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Goesaert v. Cleary (1948) |
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), was the first case in which a majority of the United States Supreme Court determined that statutory or administrative sex classifications were subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Oklahoma passed a statute prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 but allowed females over the age of 18 to purchase it. The statute was challenged as Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violation by Curtis Craig, a male who was over 18 but under 21, and by an Oklahoma vendor of alcohol. The nominal defendant was David Boren, who was sued ex officio by virtue of his serving as Governor of Oklahoma at the time of the lawsuit.
The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a statute that denies the sale of beer to individuals of the same age based on their gender violates the Equal Protection Clause. Additionally, the Supreme Court examined for jus tertii (third party rights), in this case the vendor of the 3.2% beer.
Justice William J. Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which he was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Powell and Stevens (Justice Blackmun joined all but one part of the opinion; Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and Stewart wrote concurrences). The Court held that the gender classifications made by the Oklahoma statute were unconstitutional because the statistics relied on by the state were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the statute and the benefits intended to stem from it.