Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago
| Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago | |
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| Argued November 6 – November 9, 1896 Decided March 1, 1897 |
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| Full case name | Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago |
| Citations | 166 U.S. 226 (more)
166 U.S. 226
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| Holding | |
| The 14th Amendment's due process clause requires that states provide fair compensation for seizing private property. | |
| Court membership | |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Harlan, joined by Field, Gray, Brown, Shiras, White, Peckham |
| Dissent | Brewer |
| Fuller took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV | |
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), incorporated the takings clause of the 5th Amendment into the due process clause of the 14th Amendment by requiring states to provide just compensation for seizing private property. This was the first Supreme Court case that incorporated an amendment of the Bill of Rights and applied it to a state or local government. Prior to this case, the Bill of Rights was considered to only apply to the federal government.
The Chicago city council decided on October 9, 1880 to widen Rockwell Street, which required appropriating land owned by private individuals, as well as the right of way for property owned by Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company. In a jury trial, the jury awarded fair compensation to the individual land owners for condemning their lots, and awarded the railroad company one dollar ($1.00) for appropriating the right of way for its property (166 U.S. 226, 230). The railroad company appealed.
The City of Chicago contended that due process of law was purely procedural and only required allowing the railroad company's case to be heard: "the question as to the amount of compensation to be awarded to the railroad company was one of local law merely, and...the company appearing and having full opportunity to be heard, the requirement of due process of law was observed" (166 U.S. 226, 233).
Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Brewer was the sole dissenter, and Chief Justice Fuller took no part.
Justice Harlan argued that the concept of due process of law required that fair compensation be given for any private property seized by the state. In responding to the City of Chicago's claim that due process of law was served merely by allowing the railroad company's grievance to be heard, Justice Harlan states that satisfying legislative procedure alone is not enough to satisfy due process, writing that "In determining what is due process of law, regard must be had to substance, not to form" (166 U.S. 226, 235). Harlan then claims that part of this 'substance' of due process requires the legislation to provide for fair compensation for private property, writing that
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