Carlos Enrique Díaz de León
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His Excellency Colonel Carlos Enrique Díaz de León |
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|---|---|
| 25th President of Guatemala | |
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In office 27 June 1954 – 29 June 1954 |
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| Preceded by | Jacobo Árbenz |
| Succeeded by | Elfegio Monzón |
| Personal details | |
| Nationality | Guatemalan |
| Political party | Military |
| Occupation | Military general |
Carlos Enrique Díaz de León was the provisional President of Guatemala from 27 June to 29 June 1954. He was replaced by a military junta led by Elfego Monzón. Carlos Enrique Díaz was previously Chief of the Guatemalan Armed Forces under President Jacobo Árbenz.
Díaz had befriended Árbenz while they were both at the military academy. Díaz served in the Guatemalan army, and eventually attained the rank of Colonel. Árbenz and Díaz remained friends after Árbenz became president in 1951, and served as his chief of armed forces. In 1954 the CIA intensified operations against the Árbenz government. During this phase, an attempt was made to bribe Díaz: he was offered 200,000 US dollars to act against Árbenz. He refused, possibly because the offer was made when he was visiting Caracas with his mistress, and expected to go unrecognized.
On 18 June 1954, Carlos Castillo Armas led an invasion of Guatemala with a small force of Guatemalan exiles, as part of the US Central Intelligence Agency's "Operation PBSUCESS" to overthrow Árbenz. The invasion was accompanied by an intense campaign of psychological warfare presenting Castillo Armas' victory as a fait accompli, with the intent of forcing Árbenz to resign. Árbenz' initial intention was to repel an invasion force led by Carlos Castillo Armas by arming the military-age populace, the workers' militia, and the Guatemalan Army. However, Díaz, as chief of the Guatemalan armed forces, informed Árbenz that arming the civilians would be unpopular within the army, and that "the army [would] do its duty."
Due to this advice, Árbenz instead asked Díaz to select officers to lead a counter-attack. Díaz selected a corps of officers known to be men of personal integrity, and who were loyal to the president. Árbenz also tried to use diplomatic methods to put an end the invasion. Outside Zacapa, a small garrison of 30 Guatemalan soldiers defeated a rebel force of 180, making Árbenz believe that a military victory was possible. In reality, however, the threat of a US intervention, and the psychological warfare employed by the CIA, had left the army demoralized, and unwilling to fight. Árbenz was informed of the unwillingness of the army to fight by various means, and on 25 June decided to arm the civilian population of the capital. Díaz agreed to cooperate, along with several union leaders, but no volunteers appeared to take up arms. Seeing this, Díaz backed out of his agreement, and began to confer with other military leaders, including Elfego Monzón and Jose Angel Sanchez, about seizing power. On 26 June Díaz told Árbenz that he had tried to distribute weapons, but that he did not have the cooperation of troop leaders. The plotters spoke to US ambassador John Peurifoy, who agreed to contact Castillo Armas to arrange a cessation of hostilities: Díaz and his allies were unwilling to deal with Castillo Armas themselves. Peurifoy learned from them that they were planning on seizing power on 27 June.
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Wikipedia