Bombing of Kure | |||||||
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Part of Pacific War | |||||||
![]() Japanese battleship Haruna under attack on 28 July |
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Belligerents | |||||||
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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Casualties and losses | |||||||
133 aircraft, 102 KIA |
1 aircraft carrier, 3 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 2 armored cruisers, 2 escort ships, Several smaller warships sunk 306 aircraft destroyed, 392 aircraft damaged |
The bombing of Kure and surrounding areas by United States and British naval aircraft in late July 1945 led to the sinking of most of the surviving large warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). The United States Third Fleet's attacks on Kure Naval Arsenal and nearby ports on 24, 25, and 28 July sank an aircraft carrier, three battleships, five cruisers, and several smaller warships. During the same period the British Pacific Fleet attacked other targets in the Inland Sea region and sank two escort ships and several smaller vessels as well as damaging an escort carrier.
In July 1945 the IJN's remaining large warships were concentrated near the major naval base of Kure. The ships were effectively immobilized due to fuel shortages and were being used only as stationary anti-aircraft batteries.Admiral John S. McCain, Sr., the commander of the Fast Carrier Task Force, strongly opposed attacking Kure as he and his staff believed that the ships only posed a minor threat.
In his memoirs Admiral Halsey gave four reasons for why he attacked Kure despite McCain's objections. Firstly, he believed that the attack would boost US morale and retaliate for the Attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, secondly it would ensure that the Japanese could not disrupt the planned Soviet invasion of Hokkaido, thirdly it would prevent Japan from using its fleet as a bargaining point to secure better peace terms and finally that he had been ordered to conduct the attack by his superior officer, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.