Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents | |
---|---|
Argued January 12, 1971 Decided June 21, 1971 |
|
Full case name | Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics |
Citations | 403 U.S. 388 (more)
91 S. Ct. 1999; 29 L. Ed. 2d 619; 1971 U.S. LEXIS 23
|
Prior history | Dismissed, 276 F. Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); affirmed, 409 F.2d 718 (2nd Cir. 1969) |
Subsequent history | On remand, reversed, 456 F.2d 1339 (2nd Cir. 1972) |
Holding | |
Individuals have an implied cause of action against federal government officials who have violated their constitutional rights. Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. | |
Court membership | |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Brennan, joined by Douglas, Stewart, White, Marshall |
Concurrence | Harlan |
Dissent | Burger |
Dissent | Black |
Dissent | Blackmun |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. IV |
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), was a case in which the US Supreme Court ruled that an implied cause of action existed for an individual whose Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable search and seizures had been violated by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The victim of such a deprivation could sue for the violation of the Fourth Amendment itself despite the lack of any federal statute authorizing such a suit. The existence of a remedy for the violation was implied by the importance of the right violated.
The case has been subsequently interpreted to create a cause of action against the federal government similar to the one in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the states.
Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) agents searched the house of the plaintiff, Webster Bivens, and arrested him without a warrant. Drug charges were filed but were later dismissed by a US Commissioner (now called Magistrate Judge). Bivens filed a lawsuit alleging the violation of his Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. The government claimed that the violation allowed for only a state law claim for invasion of privacy and that the Fourth Amendment provides no cause of action but only a rebuttable defense for the FBN agents.
The District Court agreed and dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for Bivens's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on that secondary issue of whether a plaintiff can bring a claim in federal court based solely on an alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
Bivens was represented pro bono by Stephen A. Grant.