Second Battle of Kiev | |||||||
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Part of the Eastern Front of World War II | |||||||
Map of the battle |
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Belligerents | |||||||
Germany |
Soviet Union Czechoslovakia |
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Erich von Manstein Hermann Hoth |
Nikolai Vatutin Ivan Konev Ludvík Svoboda |
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Units involved | |||||||
4th Panzer Army |
1st Ukrainian Front 1st Czechoslovak Independent Brigade |
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Strength | |||||||
70,000 men 1,100 artillery pieces 250 tanks 300 aircraft |
200,000 men 3,000 artillery pieces 500 tanks 1,000 aircraft |
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Casualties and losses | |||||||
5,230 killed 20,724 wounded |
Soviet casualties: 6,491 killed 24,078 wounded Czechoslovak casualties: 30 killed 80 wounded 4 missed |
The Second Battle of Kiev involved three strategic operations by the Soviet Red Army, and one operational counterattack by the Wehrmacht which took place between 3 October and 22 December 1943.
Following the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army launched Belgorod-Khar'kov Offensive Operation, pushing Erich von Manstein's Army Group South back towards the Dnieper River. Stavka, the Soviet high command, ordered the Central Front and the Voronezh Front to force crossings of the Dnieper. When this was unsuccessful in October, the effort was handed over to the 1st Ukrainian Front, with some support from the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The 1st Ukrainian Front, commanded by Nikolai Vatutin, was able to secure bridgeheads north and south of Kiev.
The structure of the strategic operations from the Soviet planning point of view was:
In October 1943, several of Vatutin's armies were having serious trouble trying to break out of the rugged terrain of the Bukrin bend, the southern bridgehead. The 24th Panzer Corps of Walther Nehring, in an effective defensive position, had the opposing Soviet forces squeezed in. As a result, Vatutin decided to concentrate his strength at the northern bridgehead at Lyutezh.
The 3rd Guards Tank Army, commanded by Pavel Rybalko, moved northwards toward the Lyutezh bridgehead under cover of darkness and diversionary attacks out of the Bukrin bend. Masses of artillery were shifted northwards, but the movements went unnoticed by the Germans.