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Atomic fact


Logical atomism is a philosophical belief that originated in the early 20th century with the development of analytic philosophy. Its principal exponents were the British philosopher Bertrand Russell, the early work of his Austrian-born pupil and colleague Ludwig Wittgenstein, and his German counterpart Rudolf Carnap.

The theory holds that the world consists of ultimate logical "facts" (or "atoms") that cannot be broken down any further. Having originally propounded this stance in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein rejected it in his later Philosophical Investigations (secs. 46–49, 91 and sec. 81).

The name for this kind of theory was coined in 1918 by Russell in response to what he called "logical holism"—i.e., the belief that the world operates in such a way that no part can be known without the whole being known first. This belief is commonly called monism, and in particular, Russell (and G. E. Moore) were reacting to the absolute idealism dominant then in Britain and exemplified in works of F. H. Bradley and J. M. E. McTaggart.

The term was first coined in a 1911 essay by Russell entitled "The Basis of Realism." However, it became widely known only when Russell gave a series of lectures in 1918 entitled "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism". Russell was much influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein, as an introductory note explicitly acknowledges.

Russell and Moore broke themselves free from British Idealism which, for nearly 90 years, had dominated British philosophy. Russell would later recall in "My Mental Development" that "with a sense of escaping from prison, we allowed ourselves to think that grass is green, that the sun and stars would exist if no one was aware of them".

Russell referred to his atomistic doctrine as contrary to the tier "of the people who more or less follow Hegel" (PLA 178).

The first principle of logical atomism is that the World contains "facts". The facts are complex structures consisting of objects ("particulars"). This he defines as "objects' relations in terms of atomic facts" (PLA 199) is a fact, either from an object with a simple property or from different objects, in relation to each other more easily. In addition, there are judgments ("beliefs"), which are in a relationship to the facts, and by this relationship either true or false.


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