Arabization of the Jordanian Army command

Arabization of the Jordanian Army command (Arabic: تعريب قيادة الجيش العربي‎‎, Ta'reeb Kiyadat Al-Jaysh Al-Arabi) refers to the dismissal of senior British officers commanding the Arab Legion by King Hussein and the subsequent renaming of the Legion into the Jordanian Armed Forces on 1 March 1956.

Hussein's intentions to Arabize the Army command were to replace British officers with competent Jordanian officers who had been marginalized, assert political independence from Britain, and improve relations with neighboring Arab states that viewed the British with suspicion.

The British government initially responded furiously, but chose not to take further action against Jordan after they realized that Hussein's decision did not mean abandoning the British as an ally. The Jordanian streets witnessed large celebrations when the decision was made public, and relations between Jordan and other Arab states improved thereafter.

An annual celebration is held on 1 March in Jordan to mark the historic event.

The first organized army in Jordan was established in 1920, under the command of the British Captain Frederick Peake. In 1939, the Arab Legion was put under the command of John Bagot Glubb (also known as Glubb Pasha), under whom it grew into an 8,000-men strong force by the time of Jordan's independence from the British Mandate in 1946. Egyptian and Syrian radio stations had constantly transmitted propaganda against King Hussein, one of the episodes taunting him over having British officers as commanders of his army. Meanwhile, foreigners believed that Glubb Pasha was the actual ruler of Jordan rather than the King.

The pressure Britain exerted on Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact in 1955 had caused a spike in anti-British sentiment in Jordan. During Hussein's visit to London in October 1955, he tried to persuade Foreign Office officials to make changes to the Army command, but his wishes went unheeded. Subsequent negotiations led the British to promise that the Royal Engineers (RE) would have an Arab officer commanding it in 1985, rankling Hussein. Another issue that Hussein and Glubb had disagreed on was the strategy for defending the West Bank in case of a war with Israel. Glubb favored a defensive strategy while Hussein argued an offensive strategy was the better way to deter an attack.

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