Aircraft collision avoidance systems

An airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) is a type of Ground Collision Avoidance Technology (GCAT) that operates independently of ground-based equipment and air traffic control in warning pilots of the presence of other aircraft that may present a threat of collision. If the risk of collision is imminent, the system initiates a maneuver that will reduce the risk of collision. ACAS standards and recommended practices are mainly defined in annex 10, volume IV, of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Much of the technology being applied to both military and general aviation today has been undergoing development by NASA and other partners since the 1980s.

A distinction is increasingly being made between ACAS and ASAS (airborne separation assurance system). ACAS is being used to describe short-range systems intended to prevent actual metal-on-metal collisions. In contrast, ASAS is being used to describe longer-range systems used to maintain standard en route separation between aircraft (5 nm {9.25 km} horizontal /1000' {305 m} vertical).

As of 2009, the only implementations that meets the ACAS II standards set by ICAO are Versions 7.0 and 7.1 of TCAS II (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) produced by three manufacturers: Rockwell Collins, Honeywell and ACSS (Aviation Communication & Surveillance Systems; an L-3 Communications and Thales Avionics company).

As of 1973, the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) standard for transponder minimal operational performance, Technical Standards c (TSO) C74c, contained errors which affect both air traffic control radar beacon system (ATCRBS) radar and Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) abilities to detect aircraft transponders. First called "The Terra Problem", there have since been individual FAA Airworthiness Directives issued against various transponder manufacturers in an attempt to repair the operational deficiencies, to enable newer radars and TCAS systems to operate. Unfortunately, the defect is in the TSO, and the individual corrective actions to transponders have led to significant differences in the logical behavior of transponders by make and mark, as proven by an FAA study of in-situ transponders.

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